chun-zhu Chen（Christine）

美不會介入臺海危機

（本舊文發表於2015年8月10日）

美國台海專家、密蘇里州立大學教授郝志堅撰文稱，

民進黨追求台獨引起台海危機，恐把美國拖下水，

因此美國必須檢視對台的安全政策與承諾(附原文整理)：

隨著民進黨可能贏得台灣明年總統大選，美國台海專家、密蘇里州立大學教授郝志堅（Dennis Hichey）在最新一期的學術權威期刊《外交家》撰文評論，民進黨總統候選人蔡英文在兩岸議題上未有明確闡述，因此美國政府必須檢視與台灣的關係，尤其是對台海安全的承諾。

( The time has arrived for the U.S. Department of State to spearhead a detailed interagency policy review of America’s relationship with Taiwan with a special focus on its security commitments to the island. Numerous considerations point to the need for such a study.)

文章內容稱，美國國防政策規劃者質疑，民進黨尋求台獨夢想，會把美國拖入台海危機，但蔡英文卻未盡力解除美國的疑慮，且對於如何處理與北京當局的關係，態度亦模糊不清。美國也擔憂民進黨背棄民主，因為民進黨被指控擁抱中東「聚眾滋事」作法，煽動抗議群眾攻占台灣政府機構。

(But some things remain constant – including Beijing’s steadfast opposition to Washington’s military support for Taipei. U.S. decision-makers are painfully aware that, while American support for Taiwan is not the only issue that divides Washington and Beijing, it is the most contentious and longstanding problem. So lobbyists are correct when they claim that “Taiwan matters.”)

美國係台灣首要安全夥伴，也是在發生台海衝突時，唯一可能提供軍事援助的國家，且多數人認為台海一旦爆發衝突，美國會派兵協助台灣，但美國獨立智庫「芝加哥全球事務委員會」（CCGA）在2014年所做的民調顯示，高達71％的美國民眾反對美國介入台海戰爭。

(Perhaps equally worrisome for Washington, a majority of the Taiwan population believes that the U.S. will send troops to defend them if a declaration of independence leads to war with China. And a growing number (almost 40 percent) do not think the Chinese threat to attack the island is credible. This comes at a time when support among the American people for U.S. military action to help Taiwan defend itself has dropped to an all-time low. According to a poll conducted in 2014 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the overwhelming majority of the American public (71 percent) opposes sending troops to defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China.)

另外，美國若派兵介入台海戰事，不會有國家會「自願結盟」，即美國不能期盼加拿大、澳洲或歐洲盟邦提供協助。由於台海危機與越戰情況相似，美國前國防部長麥納馬拉（Robert S. McNamara）警告，美國要記取越戰慘敗的教訓，對多邊軍事行動必須三思。

(The U.S. is Taiwan’s primary security partner and the only country that might provide it with military support in a conflict with China. In the event of war, there will be no “coalition of the willing.” America cannot expect assistance from Canada, Australia, or any country in Europe. When discussing America’s failure in the Vietnam conflict, the late Robert S. McNamara, former U.S. Defense Secretary, warned that if the U.S. cannot persuade governments with similar interests and similar values of the merits of multilateral military action, it should think long and hard before proceeding unilaterally.)

文章結尾寫道，世界一直在變化，但美國對台安全政策卻數十年來未改變，1970年代所制定的政策，在現代勢必被淘汰。不過郝志堅也說，美國不應急於強化、修改或廢除對台安全承諾，並強調台美雙邊防衛關係是值得深思的議題。

(The world is changing. But the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward Taiwan have not changed for decades and U.S.-Taiwan security ties remain largely frozen in time. Many policies that were deemed necessary in the 1970s are obsolete today. Does this observation apply to America’s defense relationship with Taiwan?)

==========================

( Moreover, China is now the world’s second largest economy, one of the world’s fastest growing economies, third largest military power, and the single largest foreign holder of U.S. government debt.)

中國是全世界第二大經濟體，全世界經濟成長最快速的國家之一，

軍事實力第三強，是擁有美國最多的國債的國家。

(U.S. decision-makers are painfully aware that, while American support for Taiwan is not the only issue that divides Washington and Beijing, it is the most contentious and longstanding problem.)

美國的決策者痛苦的意識到，

美國支持台灣這件議題已經不是唯一會造就華盛頓跟北京隔閡的問題，

這問題已經存在很久了。

↑ 從這一段我們可以意識到美國並不想與北京產生衝突。

(Many predict that Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will return to power in 2016. The party has sought to “rebrand” itself as a “responsible” alternative to the ruling Kuomintang (KMT). But U.S. defense planners cannot help but wonder if the DPP will seek to entrap the U.S. in a cross-strait crisis in an effort to achieve its dreams of independence from China. Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP presidential candidate, has done little to assuage such fears. The candidate’s positions on many of the most important issues of the day remain opaque and unclear, especially her plans for handling relations with Beijing. And despite its lead in the polls, there are concerns that the DPP has given up on democracy.)

許多人預言說明年2016年民進黨會重新執政，

民退黨自稱自己比執政黨(國民黨)還要來的負責任，

(想洗刷之前的名聲)

然而，國防規劃人員卻不得不質疑，

民進黨總統參選人蔡英文努力實現從中國獨立的夢想(台獨)，

#分明是在台海危機問題上構陷美國

空心菜應該要向我們保證盡力消除台海危機的疑慮(恐懼)，可是並沒有這樣做，

候選人(空心菜)對許多重要議題的立場依然維持黑箱又模糊的說法，

特別是在與北京的立場上(兩岸關係)都特別模糊，

另外，美國擔心(關注)民進黨是不是已經放棄民主。

( For example, it is reportedly embracing a Middle Eastern practice known as “rent a mob” and subsidizing extremists who attack Taiwan’s government ministries. This makes it increasingly difficult for Americans to sensibly argue that Taiwan is a “model of democracy.”)

民進黨採行中東的聚眾滋事作法(rent a mob)，

「並資助極端份子攻擊台灣的政府部門」，

使得美國愈來愈難認為台灣是民主模範。

(此段中文採用劉屏撰文，詳見 延伸閱讀文)

註：rent a mob 烏合之眾

(The U.S. is Taiwan’s primary security partner and the only country that might provide it with military support in a conflict with China. In the event of war, there will be no “coalition of the willing.” America cannot expect assistance from Canada, Australia, or any country in Europe. When discussing America’s failure in the Vietnam conflict, the late Robert S. McNamara, former U.S. Defense Secretary, warned that if the U.S. cannot persuade governments with similar interests and similar values of the merits of multilateral military action, it should think long and hard before proceeding unilaterally.)

如果台灣與中國發生衝突，美國會是提供軍事援助的主要夥伴，

但是如果發生戰爭不會有願意幫助的同盟國，

美國不敢期待加拿大、澳洲、或任何歐洲國家會提供援助，(沒人想躺這渾水)

已故的國防部長羅伯特·麥納馬拉在討論越戰中受挫的經驗中，曾經提出警告，

如果美國沒有辦法再說服他國參與類似的戰爭，

那麼美國是不是應該再多加思考？

倘若想說服他國參與，那麼是否有這樣的興趣及價值？

↑ 扯了那麼多，就是美國不想幫忙，所以拿他國唐塞當理由，後面都是在說幫助台灣的事情要三思的重複廢話。

好了我累了，就整理到這樣吧！

反正各位可以想見美國覺得被空心菜擺了一道，

雖然扯了一些客套話，

但總而言之就是不想跟北京起衝突、不想被拖下水，

加上空心菜一直不肯給予承諾，讓他們很憂心，

文章中也可以清楚看出來美國知道這些事情是民退黨資助的，

並直言空心菜分明在做他的台獨夢！ XDD

附圖、U.S. Department of State 美國國務院

延伸閱讀：

1. 美媒指蔡「租用暴民」 美應檢視對台安全承諾

http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20150810004348-260407

2. CNN公民報導：部分民進黨員家庭是日據權貴

https://www.facebook.com/chunzhu.chen/posts/1025869014091952

原文報導：

Time to Review US Policy on Taiwan?

The world has changed. It is time for a thoughtful debate on U.S. defense ties with Taiwan.

By Dennis V. Hickey

August 05, 2015

There is big trouble brewing in “Little China” – the Republic of China (Taiwan). The time has arrived for the U.S. Department of State to spearhead a detailed interagency policy review of America’s relationship with Taiwan with a special focus on its security commitments to the island. Numerous considerations point to the need for such a study.

Every American is familiar with the rise of China. The U.S. needs China’s cooperation to cope with a wide range of pressing global problems, including worldwide economic challenges, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, health issues, dwindling energy supplies, and the sporadic crises on the Korean Peninsula to name just a few. Moreover, China is now the world’s second largest economy, one of the world’s fastest growing economies, third largest military power, and the single largest foreign holder of U.S. government debt. The changes occurring within China are astounding. But some things remain constant – including Beijing’s steadfast opposition to Washington’s military support for Taipei. U.S. decision-makers are painfully aware that, while American support for Taiwan is not the only issue that divides Washington and Beijing, it is the most contentious and longstanding problem. So lobbyists are correct when they claim that “Taiwan matters.”

Relations between Taipei and Beijing have improved enormously since 2008. However, the military buildup opposite Taiwan continues. In 2015, China’s “official” defense budget climbed 10.1 percent to approximately $141.5 billion. This marked the 24th consecutive annual increase in defense outlays. A major focus of the military modernization program appears to be improving China’s ability to conduct military operations against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and deny U.S. intervention in a cross-strait conflict. In other words, the cost of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan crisis is mounting.

Meanwhile, defense spending in Taiwan is trending downward. Taiwan’s military budget as a percentage of GDP has dropped from 3.8 percent in 1994 to 2.0 percent in 2014, and from 24.3 percent of total government spending to 16.2 percent in the same period. Troop levels dropped from 450,000 in the 1990s to 210,000 in 2014. More cuts are on the horizon. Some hope the arrival of a new president and administration in 2016 will reverse this trend. But security analysts remain skeptical. Military spending is unpopular in Taiwan.

Internal trends in Taiwan hold the potential to complicate U.S. security policy. Most people on the island now identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Moreover, opinion polls conducted in 2013 show that 37.7 percent of the people now support de jure independence from China even if it causes the mainland to attack the island (76.1 percent support independence if the mainland does not attack). Perhaps equally worrisome for Washington, a majority of the Taiwan population believes that the U.S. will send troops to defend them if a declaration of independence leads to war with China. And a growing number (almost 40 percent) do not think the Chinese threat to attack the island is credible. This comes at a time when support among the American people for U.S. military action to help Taiwan defend itself has dropped to an all-time low. According to a poll conducted in 2014 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the overwhelming majority of the American public (71 percent) opposes sending troops to defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China.

Many predict that Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will return to power in 2016. The party has sought to “rebrand” itself as a “responsible” alternative to the ruling Kuomintang (KMT). But U.S. defense planners cannot help but wonder if the DPP will seek to entrap the U.S. in a cross-strait crisis in an effort to achieve its dreams of independence from China. Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP presidential candidate, has done little to assuage such fears. The candidate’s positions on many of the most important issues of the day remain opaque and unclear, especially her plans for handling relations with Beijing. And despite its lead in the polls, there are concerns that the DPP has given up on democracy. For example, it is reportedly embracing a Middle Eastern practice known as “rent a mob” and subsidizing extremists who attack Taiwan’s government ministries. This makes it increasingly difficult for Americans to sensibly argue that Taiwan is a “model of democracy.”

The U.S. is Taiwan’s primary security partner and the only country that might provide it with military support in a conflict with China. In the event of war, there will be no “coalition of the willing.” America cannot expect assistance from Canada, Australia, or any country in Europe. When discussing America’s failure in the Vietnam conflict, the late Robert S. McNamara, former U.S. Defense Secretary, warned that if the U.S. cannot persuade governments with similar interests and similar values of the merits of multilateral military action, it should think long and hard before proceeding unilaterally.

The world is changing. But the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward Taiwan have not changed for decades and U.S.-Taiwan security ties remain largely frozen in time. Many policies that were deemed necessary in the 1970s are obsolete today. Does this observation apply to America’s defense relationship with Taiwan?

To be sure, this question makes some uncomfortable. And Washington should not rush to strengthen, revise or repeal the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. However, it makes little sense to adopt an inertial approach to the matter. Irrespective of one’s position toward the Taiwan issue, there are questions about this bilateral defense relationship that deserve thoughtful study and debate among Americans at both the popular and elite levels.

Dennis V. Hickey is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies at Missouri State University and the author of numerous books and articles about U.S.-Taiwan security relations.